Vermittlungen bei Schuldenverhandlungen zwischen Entwicklungsländern, Banken, Staaten und dem IWF

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The present work deals with debt negotiations of developing countries that are subject to mediation in various ways. Starting from the Indonesian debt agreement of 1970, which was mediated by H. J. Abs, the step to game theory is taken. Various Rubinstein bargaining variants with third parties are examined. Participants in these games are always developing countries as debtors as well as banks, states and the IMF as creditors. Initially, the international community acts as the mediating third party, then the IMF. This refers to the political discussion of a reorientation of the IMF regarding stronger engagement in debt negotiations. Since the IMF would thus simultaneously find itself in the position of creditor and independent mediator, a conflict of interest is obvious. Here an arbitration procedure shows a solution path. An uninvolved third party is introduced as arbiter into the game and its effects are examined. This work shows that an arbitration procedure for insolvent developing countries is superior to other approaches, as it does not induce undesirable welfare effects and can balance power asymmetries.